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ABSTRACT 
Analysis of the Relationship between Economic Freedom and the Stability of Stock 
Prices 
by 
Jinyu Qiu, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2016 
Major Professor: Dr. Tyler J. Brough 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
The objective of this study is to re-investigate the relationship between 
macroeconomic factors and the price stability of individual securities by using an 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) sample. Instead of using a large sample of 327 
ADRs in Blau, Brough, and Thomas’ (2013) study, I focused on a panel data of 150 
ADRs from 30 countries over the 2003-2007 period. Empirical evidence is provided to 
support whether economic freedom in the ADR home country reduces ADR volatility. In 
this replication study, the analysis is conducted within the pooled ordinary least square as 
the method of estimation. The findings show that economic freedom does have 
significant impact on ADR volatility.  
(30 pages) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, many empirical studies have reached the conclusion that 
nations which have fewer restrictions on private agents and transactions tend to have higher 
levels of economic growth. (Heckelman, 2000). Economic freedom is that aspect of human 
liberty that is concerned with the material autonomy of the individual in relation to the state 
and other organized groups (Beach and Kane, 2008). Economic freedom is most commonly 
associated with a viewpoint of the classical liberal, which emphasizing free markets and 
private property. Classical liberals argue that economic freedom is embodied in the rule of 
law, property rights and freedom of contract. Friedrich Hayek was an Austrian and British 
economist and philosopher in the 20th-century. He was an advocate of free-market 
capitalism and has pointed out that the certainty of law contributed to the prosperity of 
Western world more than any other single factor (Hayek, 1953). For Hayek, economic 
growth is only possible where human freedom is maximized, and freedom is ordered 
through law. In some sense, the rule of law is required for economic freedom, because it is 
a necessity to ensure that human interaction is orderly and served the best interests of all 
society. In other words, free markets and the protection of private property rights lead to 
prosperity. Inspired by Hayekian theory, many studies examine the linkage between 
economic freedom and growth. Economic institutions, such as private property, rule of law, 
and contract enforcement are extremely important for economic growth and development 
(Williamson and Mathers, 2011). While much of the literature has focused on the 
relationships between economic freedom and financial development. For instance, Stocker 
(2005) showed that countries that experience an increase in economic freedom will 
contemporaneously realize high equity market returns. Roychoudhury and Lawson (2010) 
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find that countries with higher values on the Economic Freedom of the World index, enjoy 
lower sovereign bond default risk as measured by Moody’s credit ratings and by sovereign 
bond spreads over ten-year US Treasury bonds. More insightful, Blau, Brough, and 
Thomas (2013) focused on a pivotal effect: the macro-level features of the volatility of 
individual securities. They focus on volatility of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 
prices while conditioning on ADR’s home-country macroeconomic characteristics that 
relate to economic freedom. This direction is different from other studies which investigate 
the level of ADR liquidity on home-market features that measure the quality of legal and 
political institutions (Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006). They attempted to test the 
variation in macro-level conditions across of a sample in individual securities by examining 
the volatility of 327 ADRs with underlying firms from 41 countries of the world during a 
five-year period (2003 to 2007). 
An important topic in asset pricing research is the relation between stock market 
volatility and stock returns. Volatility is a statistical measure of the dispersion around the 
mean or average return of a security’s price to change over time. Volatility has become an 
essential element for many reasons. For the market, volatility is the measure for a 
functionality of financial market, because it is a significant factor that affects the flow of 
capital into equity markets. For securities, volatility of the stock is a significant factor in 
determining the bid-ask spread. Prior study showed that individual firms’ stock return 
volatility rises after stock prices fall (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Cheung and Ng, 1992). 
Duffee (1995) documented that a strong positive relation between firm stock returns and 
volatility and this positive relation is strongest for both small firms and firms with little 
financial leverage.  
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The main objective for this replication study is to re-examine the effect of 
macroeconomic characteristics on the volatility of ADRs while conditioning on the level 
of the home country's economic freedom. Instead of a large sample of 327 American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in Blau, Brough, and Thomas’ study, I focus on a panel data 
of 30 countries by using a sample of 150 ADRs over the 2003-2007 period.  
The motivation of this replication study has many reasons. First, there is a long 
tradition in economics that links economic freedom to positive effects. Based on an insight 
of political economy, it is a meaningful learning by examining the relationship between 
economic freedom and financial markets. Second, the study progress will contribute to 
develop my individual career as well as mainly achieve the academic purpose. Besides, by 
using a financial market indicator to performance the value of economic freedom may have 
significant implications for my research process. Thus, it is reasonable to undertake study 
of the relation between the volatility of security prices and the degree of economy freedom. 
In this study, I use the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW) as the 
measure of economic freedom. The Fraser Institute has published annual “Economic 
Freedom of the World Index” reports since 1990 for a considerable number of countries, 
which have been widely used in a range of studies. Lawson and Block developed a good 
numerical measure of economic freedom and showed that it is strongly correlated with 
economic growth (Holcombe, 1998). Economic freedom contains several components, 
including (1) the size of a government, (2) a stable monetary system, (3) secure private 
property rights, (4) an impartial legal system of credit, labor, and business, and (5) low 
barriers to international exchange. I gather data of this five components that make up the 
economic freedom score for each country in the sample. Regarding other component 
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measures, I also obtain the following sub-components of the index: credit market regulation 
score and home-country government market control score.  
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II. METHODOLOGY 
I calculate volatility in two different ways. First, I calculate the standard deviations 
of daily raw returns in each year (σtotal). Second I estimate the following equation at the 
daily level. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
In equation (1), let Rm,t denotes the return on S&P Composite Index for security m 
at day t. Then calculate idiosyncratic volatility (σidiosyncratic) by estimating the standard 
deviation of daily residuals εi,t obtained from equation (1). After calculating total volatility 
and idiosyncratic volatility, I find an inverse correlation between economic freedom and 
ADR volatility. I also examine the correlation between ADR volatility and the components 
of economic freedom. I find that the strength of property rights (Prop), the soundness of 
money (Sound$), and the level of free trade (Trade) are each negatively related to ADR 
volatility. The components of government size (GovSize), general regulation (Reg), credit 
market regulation (CrdtReg), and market control (MktCont) had initial scores that scaled 
from zero to 10, 10 being the smallest government size, the least regulation, the lowest 
market control, and the lowest level of credit market regulation. For interpretation purposes, 
I subtract these initial scores from 10 to obtain scores that are represent the inverse relation 
of these variables with the economic freedom score. Since I subtract the components of 
GovSize, Reg, CrdtReg, and MktCont from 10 to obtain these rescaled variables, I find that 
each of these economic freedom components lead to more price instability. These findings 
support that an important relation between economic freedom and the stability of stock 
prices. After this analysis, I test the relationship between ADR volatility and some macro-
level characteristics that are related to economic freedom. For instance, results prove that 
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economic freedom is inversely correlated to the level of home country’s corruption and 
amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Besides economic freedom is 
positively related to the home country’s GDP and amount of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). These results from my analysis also verify that macro-level characteristics have an 
effect on the stability of prices. Finally, I find that large portion of home country’s stock 
volume in GDP also reduces ADR volatility.  
When regressing volatility on controls, I employ the Pooled Ordinary Least Square 
regression approach and fixed effect are performed. With 5 years of panel data, I can use 
the fixed effects transformation to eliminate the unobserved effect. A Hausman test rejected 
random effects model which mean an F-test finds differences across the cross-section and 
time-series observations (Blau, Brough, and Thomas, 2013), thus, all analysis is based on 
the results by using the Pooled Ordinary Least Square regression approach. In all models, 
I only include one institutional variable at a time to avoid multicollinearity issue. I start the 
presentation with the key variables of our interest: aggregate score of Economic Freedom 
Index and followed by all the individual components.  
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III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
To assure that there are no data errors and to derive the appropriate control variables 
for the main estimations. I replicate the original data by using a portion sample of ADRs 
from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). This data contain 150 ADRs from 30 
countries across the world over the period of five years from 2003-2007. The ADR 
characteristics are calculate from the analysis of four distinct components which are daily 
prices, market capitalization, share turnover (daily volume divided by shares outstanding), 
and bid-ask spreads. In the economic freedom data part, from the Frazer Institute, the five 
component scores are equally weighted and averaged to get an overall economic freedom 
(EF) score for each country. The economic freedom score is count between zero and ten. 
Scores closer to ten represent home countries that has more economic freedom. In the home 
country characteristics dataset, I obtain a corruption score from Transparency International 
(Corruption Perception Index). Also, I get data on GDP, FDI, ODA, and proportion of 
home country stock volume in GDP from the World Bank’s Development Indicators 
dataset.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables. 
Panel A reports the estimates of my volatility measures. I find that the mean estimate for 
σtotal is 0.0224 while the mean for σidiosyncratic is 0.0206. Panel B reports that the average 
ADR in this sample has a price of $33.85 and a market capitalization of nearly 176 million. 
Then the panel reports that mean turnover is 10.42 percent. Finally, the average closing 
daily bid-ask spread is $0.14. Panel C shows the summary statistics for the measure of 
economic freedom and the five components for the 30 home countries in this sample. There 
are three components directly related to economic freedom. Property right protection 
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(Prop), the soundness of money (Sound$), and the level of free trade (Trade) are each 
directly related to the economic freedom score. However, the size of the federal 
government (GovSize), the strength of regulation, the level of market control, and the 
strength of credit market regulation are each inversely related to the economic freedom 
score. In Panel C, I find that he mean of EF for the data used in this sample is 7.52 while 
the minimum is 5.96 and the maximum is 9.13. This relatively high mean EF score from 
my result might prove the fact that only relatively free countries can have firms of sufficient 
size to issue ADRs. 
Panel D shows the statistics that describe the other home countries macro-level 
variables. These variables are also correlated with economic freedom. Corruption in the 
home country (Corrupt) has a mean score of 3.41. The mean GDP per capita (GDP) of the 
home country is $27,635 (in current US $ for 2003-2007). The mean of net official 
development assistance (ODA) is $228 million (in current US $ for 2003-2007) while the 
mean of net foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) is $49.64 billion (current US dollars 
for 2003-2007). The last variable is measuring the trading volume on the home country’s 
stock market (StockMkt), the mean trading volume as a percentage in GDP is 66.75%. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL TEST AND RESULTS 
4.1. Pearson correlation analysis between Economic Freedom and other Macro-Level 
Characteristics 
In accordance with the Blau, Brough, and Thomas’ paper, I estimate the correlation 
between the economic freedom index and the components and sub-components. Then, I 
also examine the correlation between economic freedom and the other macroeconomic 
factors. In Table 2, Panel A reports the correlation matrix for economic freedom and its 
components, while Panel B shows the correlation between economic freedom and the other 
macro-level characteristics. The partial correlations of the economic freedom components 
in Table 2 shows that, government size, the level of regulation, market control, and credit 
market regulation are each mostly negatively related to the economic freedom index with 
p-value less than 0.01 per cent. Market control and level of free trade are strongly 
negatively correlated, r = -0.8517, p < 0.01 as expected, thereby the less regulatory control 
generates more open market. The exception is that property right protection, the soundness 
of money, and the level of free trade are directly related to economic freedom. These 
relationships are in support of original paper, while the components with the highest 
correlation with economic freedom are Reg (correlation = -0.869, p-value = 0.000), Prop 
(correlation = 0.8247, p-value = 0.000), and MktCont (correlation = -0.6387, p-value = 
0.000). I find that GovSize has the lowest correlation with the economic freedom score 
(correlation = -0.1755, p-value = 0.000) in these components.  
Panel B reports the matrix examining the correlation between the economic 
freedom index and the other macro-level characteristics. The first row of Panel B shows 
that economic freedom is inversely related to Corrupt (correlation = -0.8933, p-value = 
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0.000), ODA (correlation = -0.6814, p-value = 0.000) and FDI (correlation = -0.11, p-value 
= 0.002). In these correlation relationships, Corrupt appears to be most correlated with 
economic, while FDI appears to be least correlated although the correlation coefficient for 
FDI is still significant at the 0.01 level (correlation = 0.11, p-value = 0.002). 
4.2. Pearson correlation analysis between ADR Volatility and Economic Freedom 
In this part of the study, I examine the correlation between our two measures of 
ADR volatility and economic freedom scores. I estimate volatility two different ways in 
Panel A. Table 3 shows the estimated correlation coefficients for economic freedom and 
its components. Column [1] shows the results for total ADR volatility while columns [2] 
presents the results for idiosyncratic volatility. 
Table 3 reports that volatility is significantly correlated with the economic freedom 
in the ADR home countries. In my dataset, I do not find that ADR volatility is related to 
the size of the home country’s government size, level of general regulation, and credit 
market regulation. However, I find that volatility is negatively related to Prop, Sound$, and 
Trade indicating that greater property right protection, more sound money, and higher 
levels of free trade can improve the stability of ADR prices.  
As I mentioned before, Pooled OLS regression approach is used in this study. Since 
I need to control for one variable at a time for other factors that influence ADR volatility 
in a multivariate framework. Therefore, I estimate the initial equation using pooled stock-
year data. 
𝜎𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙 𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
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The dependent variables include volatility estimates (in percent) for each ADR i during 
year t. I estimate equation (3) separately for each volatility measure j where j is defined as 
total volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility. I include as independent variables several 
control variables. The natural log of the price of ADR i during year t, the natural log of the 
market size, the share turnover, and the average daily bid-ask spread. The key variables of 
our interest is EF, which is the economic freedom score for each ADR i during year t and 
followed by all the individual components of the economic freedom score. According to 
Blau, Brough, and Thomas’ paper, I estimate equation (2) using two-way fixed effects, 
since they found a Hausman test rejects the presence of random effects while an F-test 
finds differences across the cross-section and time-series observations. 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (2). Panel A presents the 
estimate for total volatility. When examining the estimates for the control variables, I find 
that ADRs with lower prices, less market capitalization, and higher turnover have higher 
volatility. However, the estimate for control variable ln(sizei,t) is negative but statistically 
insignificant, p > 0.05. After including these controls, I find in column [1] that the estimate 
for EF is negative and significant (estimate = -0.0029, p-value = 0.000). In columns [2] 
through [8], I include each of the seven components of economic freedom separately. In 
column [2], I find that the estimate for GovSize is close to zero (estimate = 0.0008, p-value 
= 0.029). In column [3], I find that the estimate for Prop is statistically zero (estimate = 0, 
p-value = 0). Columns [4] and [5] report that, after controlling for other factors that 
influence ADR volatility, Sound$, and Trade produce estimates that are negative and 
statistically significant. Columns [6] through [8] show the results when I include Reg, 
MktCont, and CrdtReg as independent variables. The estimates for these variables are 
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positive and statistically significant. These results are similar to those reported in Table 3 
where I examine the univariate correlation. Further, the conclusions I obtain from Panel A 
and Panel B are similar to the conclusions that obtain from original paper by Blau, Brough, 
and Thomas when I include total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility as our dependent 
variables. However, I find that all estimates of ln(sizei,t)’s p-value in Panel B are not as 
significant at 0.1 level as that reported in the original paper.  The term of sizei,t represents 
the market capitalization, which calculate by the daily stock price times the number of 
shares outstanding. Due to the limited power of the sample I estimate, the number of shares 
outstanding is probably not strong enough to offer a significant result. Besides, it can be 
noticed that based on Panel A and Panel B, the adjusted R-squared statistics range from 
0.3531 to 0.3823 and 0.3998 to 0.4230, respectively.  
It is noted that all the results provided above are all consistent with the results 
provided by the subsection of original paper, which confirmed that improvements in 
economic freedom lead to more stable stock prices. Thus, to reduce ADR volatility, 
property right protection, sound money, and greater free trade are definite required. On the 
contrary, higher volatility could result from the level of regulation (both generally and 
specifically in credit markets) and greater capital market controls.  
4.3 The Relation between ADR Volatility and other Macro-Level Characteristics 
Similarly, in this subsection, the relation between ADR volatility and other 
economic freedom related macro-level characteristic will explore. Consistent with the 
results from the original paper, the gross domestic product, foreign direct investment, and 
the trading volume on a country’s stock market are find each directly related to economic 
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freedom, while the level of corruption and ODA are negatively correlated with economic 
freedom.     
 Table 5 reports the correlation between two different ways of estimating volatility 
and the macro-level characteristics discussed above by using daily CRSP returns. A similar 
estimate correlation is find across both total and idiosyncratic volatility. As shown in 
column [2], the positive correlation (correlation = 0.1347, p-value = 0.000) suggests a less 
corruption leads to more stable ADR prices. Another significant positive relation is find 
between ODA and ADR volatility (correlation = 0.1481, p-value = 0.000), which prove the 
idea that security prices could also be destabilized by the official development assistance. 
At the same time, GDP and FDI (correlation = -0.1056, p-value = 0.004), (correlation = -
0.0855, p-value = 0.019) are negatively related with ADR volatility, respectively, 
suggesting that a smaller economies and countries with a greater foreign direct investment 
tend to have a higher ADR volatility. The result of trading volume on the capital markets 
of ADR home countries in column [2] shows a significant negative relation with ADR 
volatility. However, compared with column [2], column [1] shows a similar correlation, 
but less significance (correlation = -0.1056, p-value = 0.004) of trading volume on the 
capital markets of ADR home countries and ADR volatility.  
To investigate the other factors that influence the level of ADRs volatility, I add 
the macro-level characteristics in the following equation by using pooled stock-year data. 
Modified equation (3) shows below, which has similar dependent and independent 
variables as I described in equation (2).  The variables included in MACRO are Corrupt, 
GDP, ODA, FDI and StockMkt in this equation.  
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𝜎𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙 𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
Again, according to the original paper, a Hausman test rejected the presence of 
random effects. I therefore estimate equation (3) in two-way fixed effects. Table 6 reports 
the results from estimating equation (3), Panel A and B present the results when use total 
volatility and idiosyncratic volatility, respectively. Similar results are obtained from both 
panels. Thus, for brevity, I only discuss the results in Panel A. Similar to my findings in 
Table 4, and the estimates for the control variables suggest that ADRs with lower prices, 
less market capitalization, and higher turnover have higher volatility. In column [1], after 
controlling for other independent variables, Corrupt results a positive and significant 
estimate (estimate = 0.0007, p-value = 0.000) indicating that ADRs with more corrupt 
home countries have higher volatility. In column [2], the estimate for GDP is zero and 
significant (estimate = 0, p-value = 0.046). This result indicates that home countries’ GDP 
does not have effect on ADR volatility. I also find that ODA does not have any contribution 
on volatility in column [3]. I do not find evidence that FDI and StockMkt produce estimates 
that are statistically different from zero.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this replication study, I re-examine the linkage between macroeconomic 
characteristics that are related to economic freedom and the stability of security prices. To 
reach the result, I use a sample setting of ADRs, which reflect the variation in 
macroeconomic conditions while focusing on stock-specific volatility. After choosing the 
sample, first, I gather the home country’s economic freedom score and macro-level 
characteristics data. Second, I explore the correlation between economic freedom and the 
components included that make up economic freedom as well as other macro-level factors 
in the home countries. Then I calculate the volatility with 150 ADRs from 30 countries 
across the globe that all meet the rigorous listing requirements of the major stock exchanges 
in the U.S. Within two measures of volatility (total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility), 
the pooled OLS is used in the estimation process. After examining the effect of economic 
freedom score and other macro-level factors in the home countries of ADRs on price 
volatility. The findings illustrate that greater economic freedom in the ADR’s home 
country results in less volatility in security prices. Besides, I also find that sound money, 
and more open market leads to more stable ADR prices. Furthermore, I only conclude that 
stronger government control on market results in less stable ADR prices. The weak 
evidence shows that the size of government still effects on price volatility, but not 
significantly. At the same time, higher general regulation and credit market regulation lead 
to less stable ADR prices, but not statistically significant as well. GDP and development 
assistance do not have effect on volatility of ADRs. In other macro-level factors tests, the 
results suggest that more corrupt countries leads more unstable ADRs prices.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table provides statistics that describe the sample used throughout the analysis. I 
estimate volatility two different ways in Panel A. First, I calculate the standard deviations 
of daily raw returns in each year (σtotal). Second I calculate idiosyncratic volatility 
(σidiosyncratic) by estimating the standard deviation of daily return residuals obtained from a 
standard market model. Panel B reports different ADR characteristics. From WRDS I 
obtain prices (price), outstanding shares, and daily closing bid-ask prices. In Panel C, I 
gather data from Frazer Institute and obtain economic freedom scores (EF) and scores 
from each of the components of the economic freedom score. GovSize is score from zero 
to 10 measuring the size of the home country’s federal government. Prop is a score from 
zero to 10 measuring the level of property right protection. Sound$ is a 0 to 10 score 
measuring the soundness of money in each home country. Trade is a score measuring the 
level of free trade. Reg is a score measure the strength of general regulation. MktCont is a 
score regarding the level of government control on markets. CrdtReg is a score measure 
the strength of credit market regulation. In Panel D, I obtain data from the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index that provides a scored based on the level of 
corruption (Corrupt) in each of the home countries. From World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database I gather data on GDP, ODA, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) data. 
 
Panel A. Volatility Estimates 
 Mean Medium 
Stand. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
      
σtotal 0.0224 0.0196 0.0128 0.0086 0.1706 
σdiosyncratic 0.0206 0.0176 0.0129 0.0074 0.1701 
      
Panel B. ADR Characteristics  
      
price 33.8459 26.0900 31.8199 0.1550 538.9200 
size 176,323,312 35,439,222 407,462,011 34,776 5,318,105,520 
turn 0.0104 0.0045 0.0580 0.0000 10.8064 
spread 0.1398 0.0500 0.4015 0.0000 37.2100 
      
Panel C. Economic Freedom Components  
      
EF 7.5261 7.7300 0.6870 5.9600 9.1300 
GovSize 3.8482 3.7128 1.0942 0.6980 6.1937 
Prop 7.1267 7.4779 1.2845 3.8013 9.1381 
Sound$ 9.0434 9.4491 0.8563 4.2860 9.7763 
Trade 7.9884 8.2260 0.8533 5.5962 9.6029 
Reg 2.7221 2.6016 0.9751 1.0176 5.4633 
MktCont 4.6331 3.8462 3.0990 0.7692 10.0000 
CrdtReg 1.1171 0.6667 1.0783 0.0000 4.2396 
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Panel D. Other Home Country Characteristics 
 Mean Medium 
Stand. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
      
Corrupt 3.4063 2.7000 2.1356 0.3000 8.1000 
GDP 27635.62 33982.95 17961.53 638.15 87772.69 
ODA 228,660,343 0.00 511,371,716 0.00 2,935,590,000, 
FDI 49,639,024,476 22,410,807,389 81,411,617,552 623,291,744 734,000,000,000 
StockMkt 66.75 62.20 54.63 0.4849 390.39 
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Table 2 
Correlation Coefficients 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Panel A reports the results for the 
economic freedom score (EF) and the components included that make up economic 
freedom. Panel B presents the correlation estimates for EF and the other macro-level 
factors. Corrupt is a score from zero to 10 based on the level of corruption in the home 
country. ODA is the amount of Official Development Assistance. FDI is the foreign direct 
investment in each home country. StockMkt is the percentage of aggregate trading volume 
in GDP from each home country.  
Panel A. Economic Freedom Components 
 EF Govsize Prop Sound$ Trade Reg MktCont CrdtReg 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
         
EF 1.0000 -0.1755 0.8247 0.7960 0.7819 -0.8690 -0.6387 -0.6432 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GovSize  1.0000 0.2132 0.2284 0.1082 0.1131 -0.1645 0.0753 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.038) 
Prop   1.0000 0.7248 0.5958 -0.6978 -0.4863 -0.4674 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sound$    1.0000 0.7235 -0.5947 -0.6299 -0.485 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade     1.0000 -0.583 -0.8517 -0.4671 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reg      1.0000 0.4802 0.7520 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
MktCont       1.0000 0.2555 
        (0.000) 
CrdtReg        1.0000 
         
Panel B. Other Macro-Level Characteristics 
 EF Corrupt GDP ODA FDI StockMkt 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
EF 1.0000 -0.8933 0.7060 -0.6814 0.1100 0.3624 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Corrupt  1.0000 -0.8048 0.6359 -0.2235 -0.3235 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP   1.0000 -0.6051 0.1918 0.2334 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ODA    1.0000 -0.0227 -0.1725 
     (0.986)  (0.000) 
FDI     1.0000 0.3053 
      (0.000) 
StockMkt      1.0000 
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Table 3 
Correlation 
The table reports the correlation between two volatility measures and economic freedom 
scores. I include the economic freedom score (EF) and the components included that 
make up economic freedom. GovSize is score from zero to 10 measuring the size of the 
home country’s federal government. Prop is a score from zero to 10 measuring the level 
of property right protection. Sound$ is a 0 to 10 score measuring the soundness of money 
in each home country. Trade is a score measuring the level of free trade. Reg is a score 
measure the strength of general regulation. MktCont is a score regarding the level of 
government control on markets. CrdtReg is a score measure the strength of credit market 
regulation. Corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each correlation 
coefficient. 
 
 σ(total)i,t σ(diosyncratic)i,t 
 [1] [2] 
   
EF -0.1052 -0.0843 
 (0.004) (0.02) 
GovSize -0.0671 -0.0673 
 (0.065) (0.064) 
Prop -0.1213 -0.1099 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Sound$ -0.2088 -0.1919 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade -0.1026 -0.0838 
 (0.005) (0.021) 
Reg 0.0270 -0.0024 
 (0.458) (0.948) 
MktCont 0.1438 0.1291 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
CrdtReg 0.0704 0.0527 
 (0.053) (0.147) 
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Table 4 
Regression 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation using pooled stock-
year data. 
𝜎𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙 𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐹𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variables include volatility estimates for each ADR i during year t. I 
estimate equation (2) separately for each volatility measure j where j is defined as total 
volatility (Panel A), and idiosyncratic volatility (Panel B). I include as independent 
variables several control variables. The natural log of the price of ADR i during year t, 
the natural log of the market capitalization, the share turnover (volume scaled by shares 
outstanding), and the average daily bid-ask spread. The variable of interest is EF, which 
is the economic freedom score for each ADR i during year t. Because of the potential for 
severe multicollinearity due to the high level of correlation between components and the 
economic freedom score, I do not include all of the components and economic freedom 
score in one regression. p-values are reported in parentheses below each estimate. 
 
Panel A. Total Volatility  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Intercept 0.0669 0.0401 0.0391 0.0652 0.0639 0.0416 0.0426 0.0418 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(pricei,t) -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.0082 -0.0072 -0.0078 -0.0077 -0.0076 -0.0079 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(sizei,t) -0.0001 0 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0 
 (0.6855) (0.9741) (0.4728) (0.4951) (0.7107) (0.6084) (0.6473) (0.9596) 
Turni,t 0.1333 0.1413 0.1246 0.1322 0.1338 0.1336 0.1289 0.1323 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spreadi,t 0.0198 0.0008 0 -0.0022 -0.0023 0.0015 0.0006 0.0016 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EFi,t -0.0029        
 (0.000)        
GovSizei,t  0.0008       
  (0.029)       
Propi,t   0      
   (0.000)      
Sound$i,t    -0.0022     
    (0.000)     
Tradei,t     -0.0023    
     (0.000)    
Regi,t      0.0015   
      (0.000)   
MktConti,t       0.0006  
       (0.000)  
CrdtRegi,t        0.0016 
        (0.000) 
Adj R2 0.3726 0.3531 0.3823 0.3706 0.3723 0.3620 0.3674 0.3669 
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Panel B. Idiosyncratic Volatility  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Intercept 0.068 0.0429 0.0431 0.0669 0.0659 0.0450 0.0457 0.0451 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(pricei,t) -0.0081 -0.0083 -0.0086 -0.0077 -0.0082 -0.008 -0.008 -0.0082 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(sizei,t) -0.0003 -0.0002 0 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.211) (0.4585) (0.8599) (0.1312) (0.2207) (0.1847) (0.1924) (0.3597) 
Turni,t 
0.0121 
(0.000) 
0.0128 
(0.000) 
0.0113 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.000) 
0.0121 
(0.000) 
0.0122 
(0.000) 
0.0117 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.000) 
Spreadi,t 
0.0209 
(0.000) 
0.0219 
(0.000) 
0.0245 
(0.000) 
0.0198 
(0.000) 
0.0209 
(0.000) 
0.0216 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.000) 
0.0233 
(0.000) 
EFi,t 
-0.0026 
(0.000) 
       
GovSizei,t  
0.0009 
(0.0112) 
      
Propi,t   
0 
(0.000) 
     
Sound$i,t    
-0.0002 
(0.000) 
    
Tradei,t     
-0.0022 
(0.000) 
   
Regi,t      
0.0012 
(0.0015) 
  
MktConti,t       
0.0005 
(0.000) 
 
CrdtRegi,t        
0.0015 
(0.000) 
Adj R2 0.4140 0.3998 0.4230 0.4118 0.4151 0.4029 0.4103 0.4093 
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Table 5 
Correlation 
The table reports the correlation between two volatility measures and economic freedom 
scores. Corrupt is a score from zero to 10 based on the level of corruption in the home 
country. GDP is the gross domestic product per capital. ODA is the Official Development 
Assistance amount. FDI is the foreign direct investment in each home country. StockMkt 
is the aggregate trading volume in each home country. Corresponding p-values are 
reported in parentheses below each correlation coefficient.  
 
 σ(total)i,t σ(diosyncratic)i,t 
 [1] [2] 
Corrupt 0.1522 0.1347 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP -0.1182 -0.1056 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
ODA 0.1586 0.1481 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI -0.0712 -0.0855 
 (0.05) (0.019) 
StockMkt 
-0.046 
(0.206) 
-0.0811 
(0.026) 
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Table 6 
Regression 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation using pooled stock-
year data. 
𝜎𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙 𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variables include volatility estimates for each ADR i during year t. I 
estimate equation (2) separately for each volatility measure j where j is defined as total 
volatility (Panel A), and idiosyncratic volatility (Panel B). I include as independent 
variables several control variables. The natural log of the price of ADR i during year t, 
the natural log of the market capitalization, the share turnover (volume scaled by shares 
outstanding), and the average daily bid-ask spread. The variable of interest is MACRO, 
which include the macro-level characteristics. The variables included in MACRO are 
Corrupt, GDP, ODA, FDI, and StockMkt. I estimate equation (3) using two-way fixed 
effects. p-values are reported in parentheses below each estimate. 
 
Panel A. Total Volatility  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Intercept 0.0425 0.0453 0.0416 0.0441 0.0411 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(pricei,t) -0.0074 -0.0075 -0.0079 -0.0075 -0.0075 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(sizei,t) -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (05166) (0.7538) (0.8536) (0.7183) (0.7186) 
Turni,t 0.0136 0.0135 0.0129 0.014 0.014 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spreadi,t 0.0189 0.0197 0.0212 0.0195 0.0197 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corrupti,t 0.0008     
 (0.000)     
GDPi,t  0    
  (0.0149)    
ODAi,t   0   
   (0.000)   
FDIi,t    0  
    (0.536)  
StockMkti,t     0 
     (0.7865) 
Adj R2 0.3682 0.3542 0.3711 0.3492 0.3489 
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Panel B. Idiosyncratic Volatility  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Intercept 0.0458 0.0482 0.0449 0.0475 0.0481 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(pricei,t) -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.0082 -0.0078 -0.0078 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(sizei,t) -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (01384) (0.2462) (0.5011) (0.2249) (0.193) 
Turni,t 0.0123 0.0123 0.0116 0.0127 0.0127 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spreadi,t 0.0201 0.0209 0.0223 0.0205 0.0203 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corrupti,t 0.0007     
 (0.000)     
GDPi,t  0    
  (0.046)    
ODAi,t   0   
   (0.000)   
FDIi,t    0  
    (0.3488)  
StockMkti,t     0 
     (0.1925) 
Adj R2 0.4100 0.3977 0.4146 0.3951 0.3958 
 
